

Far-Right Discourse on French Television : Legitimation, Racialized Framing and the Construction of the Algerian Other (2024–2025)

خطاب اليمين المتطرّف في التلفزيون الفرنسي : الشرعنة،
التأطير العرقي، وبناء الآخر الجزائري (2025–2024)

Discours d'extrême droite à la télévision française : légitimation,
cadrages racialisants et construction de l'Autre algérien (2024–2025)

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Abstract

This article examines the circulation, legitimation and normalization of far-right discourse on French television, with special attention to the racialized construction of Algeria and Algerians during the Franco-Algerian tensions of 2024–2025. Combining critical discourse analysis, political communication, media sociology, securitization theory and postcolonial studies, it analyzes a qualitative corpus composed of polemical talk shows, continuous-news sequences, public-service and parliamentary debate programs, radio-television interviews and digitalized excerpts redistributed online. The study argues that far-right discourse is not reducible to explicit ideological statements or to the visibility of a single political party. It is produced through a broader media ecology in which television formats, digital aggregators, opinion media, ownership structures and regulatory controversies mutually reinforce one another. The article traces the historical genealogy of this ecology, from the anti-Semitic and nationalist press of the Dreyfus period to contemporary television and digital platforms, and identifies the recurrent mechanisms of hyperbole, securitization, scapegoating, euphemization, conspiracy coding and memory revisionism. The analysis shows that Algeria operates as a privileged symbolic site where migration, security, colonial memory, diplomatic tension and national humiliation are articulated into a racialized grammar of threat. It concludes that resisting extremist normalization requires more than fact-checking: it demands historically informed media literacy, ethical editorial responsibility and critical attention to framing, repetition, affect and symbolic displacement.

Keywords

far right, French television, racism, media discourse, Algeria, securitization, postcolonial memory.

الملخص

يتناول هذا المقال مسارات تداول خطاب اليمين المتطرف في التلفزيون الفرنسي وآليات إضفاء الشرعية عليه وتطبيعته، مع التركيز على البناء المُعرقن للجزائر والجزائريين خلال التوترات الفرنسية الجزائرية في سنتي 2024-2025. ويستند إلى مدونة نوعية تضم برامج حوارية سجالية، ومقاطع من قنوات الأخبار المتواصلة، وبرامج الخدمة العمومية، ومناظرات برلمانية، ومقابلات إذاعية تلفزيونية، ومقتطفات أُعيد تداولها رقمياً. ومن خلال الجمع بين تحليل الخطاب النقدي، وسوسيولوجيا الإعلام، والاتصال السياسي، ونظرية الأمانة، والدراسات ما بعد الكولونيالية، يبيّن المقال أن خطاب اليمين المتطرف لا يقتصر

على تصريحات أيديولوجية صريحة، بل يتشكّل داخل بيئة إعلامية تتداخل فيها الأشكال التلفزيونية، ووسائل الرأي، والمجمّعات الرقمية، وبنى الملكية، والجدالات التنظيمية. وتكشف الدراسة آليات متكرّرة، منها المبالغة الخطابية، والأمننة، وصناعة كبح الفداء، والتلطيف التعبيري، والترميز المؤامراتي، والمراجعة الانتقائية للذاكرة. وتخلص إلى أن مقاومة تطبيع الخطابات المتطرفة تقتضي ثقافة إعلامية مسنودة تاريخيًا، ومسؤولية تحريرية أخلاقية، وانتباهًا نقديًا إلى التأطير، والتكرار، والأثر الوجداني، والإزاحة الرمزية.

الكلمات المفتاحية

اليمين المتطرّف، التلفزيون الفرنسي، العنصرية، الخطاب الإعلامي، الجزائر، الأمننة، الذاكرة ما بعد الكولونيالية.

Résumé

Cet article analyse la circulation, la légitimation et la banalisation du discours d'extrême droite à la télévision française, avec une attention particulière portée à la construction racialisante de l'Algérie et des Algériens durant les tensions franco-algériennes de 2024–2025. En articulant l'analyse critique du discours, la communication politique, la sociologie des médias, la théorie de la sécuritisation et les études postcoloniales, il étudie un corpus qualitatif constitué de talk-shows polémiques, de séquences de chaînes d'information en continu, d'émissions du service public, de formats parlementaires, d'entretiens radiotélévisés et d'extraits redistribués en ligne. L'hypothèse défendue est que le discours d'extrême droite ne se réduit ni aux déclarations idéologiques explicites ni à la visibilité d'un seul parti. Il se produit dans une écologie médiatique où formats télévisuels, agrégateurs numériques, médias d'opinion, structures de propriété et controverses réglementaires se renforcent mutuellement. L'article reconstruit la généalogie de cette écologie, de la presse antisémite et nationaliste de l'affaire Dreyfus aux plateformes contemporaines, puis identifie les mécanismes récurrents d'hyperbolisation, de sécuritisation, de bouc émissaire, d'euphémisation, de codage conspirationniste et de révisionnisme mémoriel. L'analyse montre que l'Algérie fonctionne comme un site symbolique privilégié où migration, sécurité, mémoire coloniale, conflit diplomatique et humiliation nationale s'articulent dans une grammaire racialisée de la menace. Elle conclut que la lutte contre la normalisation extrémiste exige davantage que la vérification factuelle : elle suppose une littératie médiatique historiquement informée et une responsabilité éditoriale attentive aux cadres, à la répétition, aux affects et aux déplacements symboliques

Mots-clés

extrême droite, télévision française, racisme, discours médiatique, Algérie, sécuritisation, mémoire postcoloniale

Introduction

The contemporary French media sphere is marked by a paradox central to democratic life. Television remains one of the principal arenas in which public problems are made visible, narrated and transformed into collective objects of debate. Yet the very formats that promise pluralism, confrontation and immediacy may also make extremist vocabularies appear ordinary, legitimate and politically actionable. Far-right discourse does not enter television only as a set of explicit doctrines. It circulates through topics, affects, recurrent formulas, guest selection, visual framing, the rhythm of interruption, and the serial repetition of crises. Its efficacy lies less in the open proclamation of ideological radicalism than in the gradual transformation of categories such as immigration, national identity, security, memory and sovereignty into emotionally charged common sense.

This article examines the forms through which far-right discourse is constructed, legitimated and amplified on French television, with particular attention to the ways Algeria and Algerians are represented during the Franco-Algerian tensions of 2024–2025. The issue is not approached as a mere inventory of controversial statements. It is treated as a discursive process : the public production of fear, resentment, historical denial and identity boundary-making through media genres that privilege speed, polemic, spectacle and visual dramatization. The object of analysis is therefore not only what is said, but also how media forms make some statements more repeatable, more memorable and more credible than others.

The research rests on a double hypothesis. First, the normalization of far-right discourse is not reducible to the electoral progress of a single party, the visibility of a single commentator, or the strategy of a single channel. It is made possible by a broader media ecology in which television, digital platforms, online aggregators, opinion magazines, ownership structures and regulatory controversies mutually reinforce one another. Second, the representation of Algeria in French debates functions as a privileged site where several layers of conflict intersect : migration and security, postcolonial memory, diplomatic tension, national identity and the symbolic struggle over the meaning of French republican universalism.

The central question can therefore be formulated as follows : how do French television formats and their digital extensions participate in the legitimation of far-right discourse, and how do they construct Algeria as a political and racialized Other within the public sphere ? The answer requires a method capable of connecting language, genre, history and political economy. It also requires a careful distinction between explicit far-right media, mainstream channels that may relay or host far-right frames, and public-service formats in which similar topics may be discussed under a pluralist or deliberative regime. This distinction matters because the discursive success of the far right often occurs precisely when

its categories travel beyond their original ideological location and become the grammar through which other actors are invited to speak.

The article proceeds in five main movements. It first presents the theoretical framework, the corpus and the methodological limits of the study. It then brings together the political context, the historical genealogy and the contemporary media ecology of the French far right, in order to avoid treating these dimensions as isolated fragments. The third part analyzes the media genres and linguistic mechanisms through which exclusionary frames become familiar. The fourth part focuses on Algeria as a political, racialized and postcolonial Other. The final discussion examines normalization, legitimacy, democratic risk and the conditions of a critical media literacy capable of resisting extremist common sense.

1. Theoretical Framework, Corpus and Method

1.1. Critical Discourse Analysis and the Politics of Fear

The article draws first on critical discourse analysis, understood not simply as a study of linguistic choices but as an inquiry into the relation between language, power and social representation. In this perspective, discourse does not merely describe reality ; it organizes visibility, distributes blame, constructs identities and legitimizes courses of action. Wodak's work on the politics of fear is particularly useful for understanding how right-wing populist discourse converts social problems into narratives of threat. It shows that the far right rarely relies only on doctrinal coherence. It often works through stories that connect heterogeneous events into a single emotional plot : decline, betrayal, invasion, humiliation and promised restoration.

Charaudeau's analysis of political discourse makes it possible to describe the rhetorical economy of televised persuasion. Political speech is not only argumentative ; it is also theatrical, affective and relational. Ethos, pathos and logos are redistributed according to the constraints of the medium. On television, the speaker must appear credible before he or she can demonstrate anything. The host's framing, the order of speaking, the visual composition of the studio and the selection of antagonists contribute to the production of credibility or disqualification. Far-right discourse benefits from this economy when it succeeds in presenting itself as frank, brave, anti-systemic or close to ordinary experience, even when it relies on simplified causalities or stigmatizing generalizations.

The notion of framing is central here. A frame selects some elements of reality and makes them more salient than others. It defines what the problem is, who is responsible, what emotions are appropriate and which solutions seem plausible. In far-right discourse, immigration is framed less as a social, economic or legal phenomenon than as an existential pressure ; Islam is framed less as a diverse religious field than as a civilizational challenge ; Algeria is framed less as a sovereign state with its own historical and political complexities than as a signifier

of migration, memory, security and diplomatic resistance. The analysis therefore focuses on the movement by which a topic becomes a problem, a problem becomes a threat, and a threat becomes a justification for exceptional measures.

1.2. Securitization, Representation and Postcolonial Memory

The article also mobilizes securitization theory. In the sense developed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, an issue becomes a security issue when it is discursively framed as an existential threat requiring extraordinary responses. The importance of this theory lies in the fact that it shifts the analysis from the objective existence of danger to the public construction of danger. This does not mean that security issues are invented or unreal. It means that their political meaning depends on the speech acts, images and institutions through which they are made urgent, exceptional and emotionally compelling.

Securitization is particularly relevant to the televised treatment of migration, urban violence, Islam, diplomatic tension and colonial memory. In the sequences studied, the passage from ordinary politics to emergency politics frequently occurs through a limited repertoire of expressions : ‘submersion’, ‘invasion’, ‘collapse’, ‘civilizational struggle’, ‘failure of the state’, ‘national humiliation’. Such terms perform an argumentative function. They do not merely intensify language ; they alter the scale of the issue and change the horizon of acceptable action. A social question framed as ‘submersion’ no longer calls for public policy, negotiation and evidence-based discussion ; it calls for defense, closure, expulsion or symbolic restoration.

Postcolonial studies provide the third pillar of the framework. Hall’s theory of representation shows that images of the Other are not passive reflections but active cultural constructions. Said’s critique of Orientalism remains essential for understanding how Maghrebian and Algerian issues may be translated into a European vocabulary of difference, backwardness, threat or civilizational hierarchy. In the French case, Algeria is not only an external country. It is the site of a dense historical entanglement involving colonization, war, migration, memory, the politics of apology, the status of Islam, and the unresolved question of republican universality. For this reason, representations of Algeria often function as displaced representations of France itself.

1.3. Corpus, Selection Criteria and Analytical Procedure

Methodologically, the study combines a historical-discursive genealogy and a qualitative analysis of media frames. The corpus consists of selected French television and broadcast-adjacent sequences dealing with the far right, immigration, security, national identity and Franco-Algerian tensions between 2024 and 2025. It includes polemical talk shows, continuous news channels, cultural and public-service programs, parliamentary debate formats, radio-television interviews and digitalized excerpts redistributed online. The aim is not to measure

the total frequency of themes or speakers across all French television. It is to reconstruct recurrent frames, argumentative patterns, lexical choices and media formats that contribute to the normalization of exclusionary discourse.

The corpus was read through five analytical categories. The first category is lexical framing : the recurrence of terms such as ‘submersion’, ‘replacement’, ‘Islamism’, ‘civilization’, ‘insecurity’, ‘humiliation’ and ‘decline’. The second is argumentative structure : analogy, slippery slope reasoning, guilt by association, scapegoating, pseudo-causal explanation and victimhood reversal. The third is media genre : the formal constraints of polemical talk shows, continuous news, interview formats, expert panels and online clips. The fourth is ideological function : the effect produced by discourse, such as making inequality appear defensive, converting political disagreement into civilizational conflict or assigning minorities the role of internal enemy. The fifth is circulation : the way a televised sequence becomes a digital fragment, a headline, a social media controversy and then a renewed television object.

The limits of the study must be stated clearly. The article does not claim statistical representativeness. It does not conflate all French media with the far right, nor does it treat every discussion of immigration, security or Algeria as extremist. Its purpose is more precise : to identify the mechanisms by which far-right frames become available, repeatable and legitimate within broader media circulation. In this sense, the study is interpretive but not impressionistic : its claims are grounded in the analysis of recurrent forms, genres and argumentative logics.

Table 1. Corpus, analytical categories and methodological function

Corpus component	Examples / scope	Analytical function
Polemical talk shows	C8, CNews, Paris Première-type debate formats ; sequences organized around confrontation	Observe interruption, antagonism, personalization, production of memorable conflict.
Continuous news channels	CNews, BFMTV, LCI and comparable formats during high-intensity news cycles	Analyze repetition, alerts, banners, expert panels and the transformation of events into crisis atmospheres.
Public-service and parliamentary formats	France 5, LCB, institutional debates and cultural programs	Distinguish deliberative or pluralist regimes from polemical frames while tracking circulation of identical topics.
Digital excerpts and aggregators	Clips, headlines, online comments, far-right aggregators and social platforms	Examine decontextualization, virality, reframing and feedback loops between television and platforms.
Franco-Algerian case materials	Sequences on Boualem Sansal, Amir DZ, deportation, bilateral agreements, memory and diplomacy	Study how Algeria becomes a symbolic site linking migration, security, postcolonial memory and national identity.

The theoretical apparatus now makes it possible to situate the object historically and institutionally. Far-right discourse cannot be understood only as a set of phrases or televised controversies ; it must be read in relation to the political conjuncture that grants it visibility, to the longer history of extremist media forms in France and to the contemporary ecology that connects television, digital platforms, ownership structures and regulatory conflict.

2. Historical Genealogy and Media Ecology of the French Far Right

This second part deliberately groups together political context, historical genealogy and media ecology. The objective is to show that contemporary far-right television discourse is neither an accidental excess of the media field nor a purely partisan rhetoric, but the outcome of a long process of adaptation between ideological repertoires, communicational formats and institutional crises.

2.1. Political Context after the 2024 Dissolution

The period studied begins in the aftermath of the dissolution of the National Assembly announced on 9 June 2024. This point requires correction because the institutional crisis of 2024 did not result from any dissolution of the Front National, which no longer existed under that name as a governing party. It resulted from the presidential decision to dissolve the lower house after the European elections, followed by early legislative elections. The elections produced a fragmented Assembly : the New Popular Front emerged as the largest bloc, the presidential camp lost its previous dominance, and the Rassemblement National achieved an unprecedented level of parliamentary expansion while remaining outside government. The result was not a stable majority but a field of permanent negotiation, obstruction and interpretive struggle.

This fragmented configuration intensified media competition over the meaning of the crisis. The far right could present itself simultaneously as a rising force and as a victim of a political system allegedly designed to prevent the ‘real people’ from governing. The presidential center could present fragmentation as a problem of governability and institutional responsibility. The left could claim electoral legitimacy while facing internal divisions over leadership, strategy and programmatic coherence. Television became one of the primary spaces in which these competing narratives were staged for mass audiences, condensed into short formulas and converted into affective positions.

The legal situation of Marine Le Pen in 2025 further contributed to the symbolic centrality of the far right. Her conviction in the case of the European parliamentary assistants of the former Front National, together with a sentence of ineligibility subject to immediate enforcement at first instance, reorganized public debate around the future of the Rassemblement National, the role of Jordan Bardella and the recurrent claim that judicial institutions are politically

biased. Such episodes are not external to media discourse. They become resources for victimization narratives, anti-elite rhetoric and mobilizing affects. They also show how legal, institutional and media temporality become entangled : a court decision becomes a breaking-news event, then a political controversy, then a digital battlefield and finally a recurrent frame of democratic crisis.

At the same time, regulatory debates involving Arcom, CNews and C8 showed that the media field itself had become an object of political conflict. The non-renewal of C8's authorization on digital terrestrial television, the strengthened interpretation of pluralism obligations after the Conseil d'État decision of 2024, and the ongoing scrutiny of informational rigor provided an institutional background against which debates about freedom of expression, editorial responsibility and ideological influence were constantly reframed. The media landscape studied here is therefore not a neutral container of political speech. It is itself a battlefield in which the rules of democratic publicity are contested.

2.2. From Political Crisis to Discursive Opportunity

Political crisis does not mechanically produce extremist normalization. It becomes a discursive opportunity when media formats translate instability into recognizable plots. In the period under study, several plots recur : the nation allegedly deprived of sovereignty ; the people allegedly dispossessed by judges, journalists and elites ; the border allegedly rendered powerless by migration ; the school, the city and the family allegedly threatened by cultural decline ; and France allegedly humiliated by foreign states, especially Algeria. These plots are effective because they join individual anxiety to collective diagnosis. They allow the viewer to experience complex issues as a single moral drama.

The far right's media advantage lies partly in its capacity to convert uncertainty into narrative clarity. Where a parliamentary configuration requires nuance, negotiation and institutional explanation, polemical discourse offers a simpler plot : betrayal, blockage, restoration. Where the Franco-Algerian relationship requires historical and diplomatic contextualization, securitarian discourse offers a simpler plot : threat, refusal, humiliation. Where migration requires demographic, economic, legal and humanitarian analysis, identitarian discourse offers a simpler plot : invasion and loss. Television formats that reward speed and antagonism are structurally receptive to such plots because they reduce the cost of interpretation for the audience.

This political sequence does not, by itself, explain the persistence of far-right frames. Their current effectiveness also depends on a historical repertoire that has repeatedly associated media innovation with enemy construction, national decline and the dramatization of crisis. The following section therefore places the contemporary moment within a longer genealogy.

2.3. Historical Genealogy of Far-Right Media in France

2.3.1. The Press as an Ideological Infrastructure : Dreyfus, Drumont and Action française

Far-right discourse in France has long been inseparable from media form. At the end of the nineteenth century, the anti-Semitic and nationalist press did not merely report ideological conflict ; it helped organize it. The Dreyfus Affair constituted a decisive moment in this process. Publications such as *La Libre Parole* and the networks associated with *Action française* transformed a judicial case into a moral and national drama. They made the figure of the internal enemy central to public interpretation and established a repertoire that would reappear in later forms : denunciation of elites, moral panic, ethnicized suspicion, conspiracy, and the dramatization of national decline.

Édouard Drumont's *La Libre Parole* illustrates the media logic of enemy construction. Its anti-Semitism was not only a set of prejudices but also a technique of political simplification. Financial scandal, social anxiety and national humiliation were connected through a single explanatory figure : the Jew as internal corrupter. The discourse offered ordinary readers a clear cause for heterogeneous problems and transformed resentment into a political language. The same logic later reappeared in different targets and vocabularies : the migrant, the Muslim, the globalist elite, the activist judge, the journalist, or the foreign state allegedly hostile to France.

Action française added a more systematic intellectual and institutional dimension to this media politics. Charles Maurras's nationalism, anti-parliamentarianism and doctrine of internal enemies gave the far right a durable grammar of suspicion. Jews, foreigners, Protestants and Freemasons were not treated as political adversaries but as agents of national disintegration. This distinction is crucial because far-right discourse often replaces disagreement with ontological suspicion. The opponent is not wrong ; he is foreign to the national body. The media function of such discourse is to name enemies, stabilize fears and make exclusion appear protective.

2.3.2. Postwar Marginality, Colonial Nostalgia and Ideological Recomposition

After 1945, the far right experienced political and symbolic delegitimation because of the collaboration of parts of its leadership and intellectual milieu with Vichy and the Nazi occupation. This marginality did not eliminate the movement. It forced it to reorganize. Periodicals such as *Rivarol* and other postwar publications offered spaces where anti-communism, resentment against the Republic, historical revisionism and colonial nostalgia could persist. The defense of French Algeria played a central role in this reconfiguration because it

allowed the transition from older forms of nationalist reaction to newer forms of anti-decolonial and anti-immigrant discourse.

The Algerian War and the end of French Algeria thus became more than historical events in far-right memory. They formed a matrix of resentment and loss. In this memory, decolonization is often narrated not as the end of colonial domination but as national abandonment, betrayal or humiliation. Such a reversal is essential for understanding later discourse on Algeria. It allows contemporary diplomatic tensions to be interpreted through an older emotional archive. Algeria becomes not only a state but also the name of an unfinished wound in the far-right imaginary. The political vocabulary of sovereignty, dignity and humiliation draws much of its affective power from this archive.

This period also produced a shift from elitist reaction to populist mobilization. The language of doctrinal nationalism gradually gave way to a more accessible rhetoric of ordinary people betrayed by elites. The internal enemy did not disappear ; it was translated into a democratic idiom. The far right increasingly claimed to defend the silenced majority against politicians, journalists, judges, intellectuals and minorities allegedly protected by the system. This populist grammar remains central to contemporary television discourse.

2.3.3. The Front National, Television and the Politics of Provocation

The creation of the Front National in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen marked an attempt to unify heterogeneous radical-right currents within an electoral party. Television did not immediately offer the far right a dominant platform, but it progressively transformed Le Pen into a recurring public figure. His media strategy involved provocation, scandal and the use of televised debate to force recognition. In a political field where access to visibility is already a form of legitimacy, the repeated invitation of an extremist figure contributes to normalization even when the framing is critical.

The 1986 legislative success of the FN and Jean-Marie Le Pen's qualification for the second round of the 2002 presidential election demonstrated that media visibility could function as political infrastructure. The far right did not need to own major television channels in order to benefit from television. It needed to master the grammar of appearance : the sharp formula, the scandalous remark, the conflictual interview, the posture of persecution after condemnation. Television's demand for memorable moments provided a stage on which provocation could be converted into recognition and recognition into political capital.

The ideological shift from explicit anti-Semitism to anti-immigration and anti-Islam discourse must be understood in this context. It did not mean the disappearance of exclusionary logic ; it meant the adaptation of that logic to a new moral and legal environment. Cultural difference, secularism, security and national identity became the respectable vocabulary through which exclusion could be articulated. The far right learned to speak the language of defense rather

than hatred, of protection rather than domination, of realism rather than racism. This metapolitical euphemization is one of the conditions of its contemporary media success.

The historical trajectory described above leads to the present media configuration. What changes in the contemporary period is not the grammar of threat itself, but the density of the channels through which it circulates and the speed with which televised sequences are converted into digital and political capital.

2.4. The Contemporary Far-Right Media Ecosystem

2.4.1. Continuous News, Opinion Media and the Hybridization of Formats

The contemporary situation differs from earlier periods because visibility no longer depends only on episodic appearances within mainstream programs. Far-right discourse now circulates through an ecosystem composed of continuous news channels, polemical talk shows, opinion magazines, websites, video platforms, online aggregators and social media accounts. This ecology allows the same frame to be produced on television, cut into short viral segments, redistributed on digital platforms and then reintroduced into broadcast debate as evidence of public concern.

CNews occupies a central place in the public debate because it combines the codes of continuous news with a strongly opinion-oriented editorial culture. It does not operate in isolation. It belongs to a wider set of media transformations in which ownership concentration, audience competition and the economics of controversy intensify the visibility of identity-based themes. The comparison often made between CNews and Fox News is meaningful less as strict equivalence than as a sign of format : high recurrence of polemical subjects, personalization of debate, strong host figures, ideological segmentation of audiences and the construction of a politically charged community of viewers.

Other channels, including BFMTV, LCI and public-service broadcasters, do not occupy the same ideological position. Nevertheless, they may participate in the circulation of similar frames when they organize debate around urgency, crisis and confrontation. The distinction between producing a far-right frame and relaying a frame is analytically important. A mainstream channel may not be far-right ; yet it can still contribute to the normalization of far-right categories if its questions, guests, images or headlines repeatedly structure a topic through insecurity, cultural incompatibility or national humiliation.

2.4.2. Digital Aggregators and the Fachosphère

Digital platforms such as Fdesouche, TV Libertés, Riposte Laïque and Boulevard Voltaire operate differently from traditional television. They do not always need to produce original reporting. Their power lies in selection, reframing, headline construction and aggregation of fragments taken from mainstream outlets. A

judicial case, a police incident, a diplomatic dispute or a cultural controversy can be placed inside a broader narrative of national decline, replacement or civilizational confrontation. This is a form of discursive re-encoding : the same event acquires an ideological function through repetition and framing.

The digital far-right sphere also benefits from asymmetry. Mainstream media devote resources to reporting, verification and production ; online aggregators select the most emotionally usable fragments, detach them from their original context and circulate them with ideological captions. The authority of the original source is preserved while the interpretive frame is transformed. This mechanism is especially effective when the fragment comes from television. The audiovisual trace gives the impression of evidence : the viewer can see a statement, an image, a confrontation, an expression of anger. The clip becomes proof, even when its meaning has been narrowed or displaced by editing.

This digital circulation contributes to what may be called the double legitimacy of far-right frames. First, institutional legitimacy : the statement has appeared on television, therefore it seems part of public debate. Second, popular legitimacy : the fragment circulates, receives comments, generates outrage and becomes a topic that 'people are talking about'. The loop is then closed when television programs refer to the digital controversy as evidence of social concern. The media object thus moves from television to platforms and back again, each passage increasing its visibility.

2.4.3. Ownership, Funding and Regulatory Conflict

Funding and ownership matter because they determine the durability of media projects that may not be profitable in purely commercial terms. Some far-right or radical-right media rely on activist donations, ideological networks, wealthy patrons, advertising or broader media groups capable of absorbing financial losses and regulatory sanctions. The result is a hybrid model in which profitability is not the only criterion of survival. Influence, agenda-setting, cultural struggle and audience loyalty become forms of capital.

The Bolloré sphere is central to debates about ownership concentration, editorial orientation and the ideological transformation of audiovisual space. The issue is not simply that a wealthy owner holds media assets. It is the combination of concentration, political proximity, recurrent identity frames and regulatory controversy that transforms ownership into a question of democratic publicity. The non-renewal of C8's authorization by Arcom and the validation of Arcom's reasoning by the Conseil d'État in 2025 gave institutional visibility to concerns about obligations, pluralism and the responsibilities of broadcast media. The discussion is therefore not reducible to censorship versus freedom of expression. It concerns the conditions under which freedom of expression can remain compatible with pluralism, informational rigor and the non-stigmatization of vulnerable groups.

At the same time, the acquisition of Altice Media, including BFMTV and RMC, by CMA CGM in 2024 illustrates a broader restructuring of French media ownership. This change does not mean that BFMTV belongs to the far-right ecosystem. It shows that the French audiovisual field is increasingly shaped by large industrial or financial actors whose strategic interests go beyond immediate editorial production. Such transformations make the study of discourse inseparable from the political economy of media.

Table 2. French media ecosystem and far-right frames

Media actor	Ownership / support	Dominant format	Discursive significance
CNews	Canal+ Group / Bolloré sphere	Opinion-oriented continuous news ; polemical debate	High recurrence of immigration, security and identity frames ; recurrent regulatory scrutiny over pluralism and informational rigor.
C8	Canal+ Group / Bolloré sphere	Entertainment-politics hybrid ; polemical talk-show culture	Illustrates the fusion of spectacle and political controversy ; authorization not renewed by Arcom and validated by the Conseil d'État in 2025.
BFMTV / RMC	Altice Media until 2024 ; CMA CGM after acquisition	Mainstream continuous news and radio-television formats	Does not belong to the far-right field, but may relay crisis frames through guest selection and high-intensity news cycles.
France 5 / LCP	Public-service or parliamentary broadcasting	Cultural, institutional and deliberative programs	Offers pluralist debate, yet Algeria can still be framed through French categories of justice, diplomacy, migration and freedom of expression.
TV Libertés / Fdesouche / Boulevard Voltaire	Digital, activist and ideological ecosystems	Alternative news, aggregation and commentary	Reframes mainstream information through anti-immigration, anti-Muslim, anti-elite or civilizational narratives.

Having identified the historical and institutional ecology in which far-right frames circulate, the analysis must now move from the question of where these discourses circulate to the question of how they become ordinary. The answer lies partly in media genres themselves : the formal organization of talk shows, continuous news and digital clips shapes what can be said, repeated and made affectively plausible.

3. Media Genres and Discursive Mechanisms of Normalization

This part studies normalization at the level of form. It shows that the same ideological frame acquires different degrees of legitimacy depending on whether it is articulated in a studio confrontation, repeated by a continuous-news device or extracted as a digital clip. The medium does not merely transmit discourse ; it transforms the social authority of discourse.

3.1. Polemical Talk Shows : Conflict as Format

Media genres are not neutral containers. They impose rhythms, expectations and affective regimes. Polemical talk shows privilege confrontation, interruption, personalization and the production of memorable statements. The guest is not only an expert or a witness ; he or she becomes a character within a dramatic scenario. The host's role is equally decisive. By choosing themes, arranging oppositions, interrupting or validating speakers and controlling the sequence of indignation, the host participates in the construction of meaning.

In such formats, disagreement is often staged as a duel. The audience is invited to identify with positions before examining arguments. The program's success depends on conflictual intensity, not on the patient reconstruction of a problem. This does not mean that talk shows cannot produce legitimate debate. It means that their formal economy favors short, affective and antagonistic discourse. Far-right speakers are particularly able to exploit this economy because their rhetoric is built around strong binaries : people versus elites, natives versus foreigners, civilization versus decline, courage versus censorship, truth versus media lies.

The logic of the 'clash' is especially important. A clash generates shareable fragments. It gives the speaker the status of someone who dares to say what others hide. It transforms objection into proof of persecution : if the host or another guest protests, the far-right speaker can present the reaction as evidence that the system refuses the truth. This circular rhetoric is difficult to counter within a format that values immediate reaction over contextual refutation.

3.2. Continuous News : Repetition, Urgency and Affective Saturation

Continuous news channels intensify the logic of urgency through repetition and temporal compression. The event is constantly updated even when no new information exists. Banners, alerts, archive images, repeated numbers, maps and expert panels create a climate in which the viewer is invited to inhabit permanent emergency. In this format, the boundary between information and interpretation becomes porous. Immigration, Islam, urban violence, diplomatic conflict and security are not merely discussed ; they are staged as signs of a world in disorder.

The effect of repetition is not only informational. It is affective and cognitive. Repetition makes a frame familiar ; familiarity can become plausibility ; plausibility can become common sense. A viewer repeatedly exposed to associations between migration and insecurity, Algeria and diplomatic hostility, Islam and civilizational tension, or regulation and censorship may gradually perceive those associations as natural. The problem is not a single false statement. It is the cumulative effect of recurrent framing.

Visual and sound elements reinforce this process. Red banners, dramatic music, urgent typography, archive images, blurred faces, police scenes and images of crowds contribute to the emotional coding of the issue. The viewer receives not only a message but a mood. Far-right normalization operates at this level of mood as much as at the level of argument. It creates a general atmosphere of threat in which exclusionary solutions appear less radical because the world has already been made to feel exceptional.

3.3. Digital Clips and the Feedback Loop of Outrage

Digital circulation completes the process. A television exchange becomes a clip ; the clip becomes a tweet, a short video, a meme, a YouTube extract, a Telegram post or a headline on an aggregator. Its circulation then becomes an argument that the topic has social importance. This feedback loop gives far-right frames a second life and a second audience. It also modifies the meaning of the original sequence by selecting only the most conflictual or emotionally charged moments.

The clip economy favors decontextualization. Nuance, hesitation, methodological caution and historical background are difficult to cut into viral fragments. Accusation, outrage, sarcasm and fear are easier to circulate. This structural preference affects public debate. It encourages speakers to produce extractable formulas. It encourages programs to stage conflict. It encourages platforms to privilege content that provokes anger. Far-right discourse adapts to this environment because it is already oriented toward polarization and symbolic condensation.

The result is not a simple linear model of influence from media to audience. It is an ecology of reinforcement. Television provides visibility ; digital platforms provide repetition ; opinion media provide ideological interpretation ; political actors provide mobilization ; regulatory controversy provides victimization narratives. Each element strengthens the others.

Table 3. Media genres and modes of amplification

Genre	Main formal features	Discursive effect
Polemical talk shows	Confrontation, interruption, personalization, staged antagonism, host-controlled tempo	Transforms disagreement into spectacle and privileges memorable conflict over contextual argument.

Genre	Main formal features	Discursive effect
Continuous news channels	Repetition, alerts, banners, archive images, expert panels, temporal urgency	Creates a permanent atmosphere of crisis and weakens the distinction between information and opinion.
Digital clips and aggregators	Selection, decontextualization, virality, reframing, comment loops	Gives ideological frames a second life online and produces the impression of broad public resonance.

The preceding sections have described the formats that amplify far-right discourse. The next step is to examine the linguistic and argumentative operations that give these formats their ideological effectiveness. Normalization depends not only on visibility, but also on the recurrent forms through which fear, blame and identity are made intelligible.

3.4. Linguistic and Argumentative Strategies

3.4.1. Hyperbole and Catastrophic Metaphor

The language of far-right television discourse relies on a limited but highly effective set of operations. The first is hyperbolization. Social phenomena are presented through terms of submersion, invasion, collapse, erasure, replacement or civilizational danger. Hyperbole does not merely exaggerate. It redefines the scale of the problem and changes the type of response that appears legitimate. If immigration is framed as ‘submersion’, ordinary policy debate becomes insufficient; exceptional measures begin to appear rational.

Catastrophic metaphor is linked to a politics of threshold. Far-right rhetoric repeatedly suggests that France is on the verge of irreversible loss. The nation is about to disappear, the border is about to collapse, the people are about to be replaced, the civilization is about to be erased. This temporality of the last chance is persuasive because it shortens deliberation. It implies that hesitation is complicity and that moderation is betrayal. Television, with its rhythm of urgency, is particularly receptive to this rhetoric of imminence.

Such language also produces affective alignment. Fear, anger and resentment are not accidental emotions; they are the political affects through which the audience is invited to interpret the world. Fear identifies the threat; anger identifies the guilty; resentment transforms inequality or uncertainty into moral injury; nostalgia promises restoration. The four affects together create a powerful motivational structure.

3.4.2. Binarization, Scapegoating and Pseudo-Causality

The second operation is binary opposition. Far-right discourse organizes political life around pairs such as people/elite, native/foreign, secure/dangerous, civi-

lization/decadence, truth/media lies and France/anti-France. This binarization eliminates intermediate positions and makes complexity look like complicity. In television formats that reward clarity, speed and conflict, such binaries are particularly effective because they produce immediate recognizability.

The third operation is scapegoating. Minorities, immigrants, Muslims, Algerians and sometimes foreign states are made responsible for heterogeneous social problems : insecurity, debt, cultural anxiety, educational crisis or national humiliation. The persuasive force of scapegoating lies in its apparent simplicity. It offers a cause, an enemy and a solution. It converts structural problems into moral accusations against visible groups.

Scapegoating often depends on pseudo-causality. Two phenomena are placed side by side and treated as if the first explained the second : migration and debt, migration and insecurity, Islam and separatism, Algeria and humiliation, antiracism and censorship. The causal link may be weak, unproven or false, but the juxtaposition is sufficient within a rapid media exchange. Once a repeated association exists, it becomes difficult to dismantle because the burden of proof shifts to those who refuse the association.

3.4.3. Euphemization, Conspiracy Coding and Memory Revisionism

The fourth operation is metapolitical euphemization. Explicitly racist statements are often replaced by culturally coded expressions : identity, civilization, way of life, values, assimilation, secularism, security or cohesion. These terms may be legitimate within democratic debate. Yet far-right discourse uses them to produce exclusion while avoiding the vocabulary of biological racism. This is why the analysis must focus not only on isolated offensive words but also on the argumentative economy in which seemingly neutral terms acquire exclusionary force.

Conspiracy coding is another recurrent mechanism. Expressions such as ‘Great Replacement’, ‘Islamism’ or ‘media lies’ create a closed interpretive system in which counterarguments are treated as further evidence of the conspiracy. If a journalist contests the frame, he is part of the media system. If a researcher provides nuance, she is accused of ideological complicity. If a regulator intervenes, regulation becomes censorship. Such discourse is resilient because it immunizes itself against contradiction.

Memory revisionism completes the system. In relation to Algeria, it often takes the form of minimizing colonial violence, rehabilitating the myth of French Algeria, or reversing historical accountability by presenting France as the humiliated victim of contemporary Algerian hostility. This does not require a fully explicit defense of colonialism. It may occur through selective silence, euphemistic vocabulary, nostalgic references or the refusal to connect present tensions to colonial history. The past is not denied ; it is reordered so that colonial domination disappears behind national injury.

Table 4. Linguistic and argumentative strategies in far-right media discourse

Strategy	Typical forms	Function
Hyperbole and catastrophic metaphor	“Submersion”, “invasion”, “collapse”, “erasure”, “replacement”	Expands the perceived scale of the problem and legitimizes exceptional responses.
Binary opposition	People/elite ; native/foreign ; civilization/decline ; us/them	Simplifies complexity and presents compromise as weakness or betrayal.
Scapegoating	Migrants, Muslims, Algerians, minorities, “globalist elites”	Transfers structural problems onto visible groups and produces moralized blame.
Euphemization	Identity, values, civilization, assimilation, secularism, security	Produces exclusion without using explicitly biological racist vocabulary.
Conspiracy coding	“Great Replacement”, “Islamism”, “media lies”	Creates a closed interpretive system in which contradiction is treated as proof.
Memory revisionism	Nostalgia for French Algeria ; minimization of colonial violence	Reorders the past to legitimize present identity politics and symbolic domination.

These mechanisms become particularly visible in the treatment of Algeria. The Algerian case is not a marginal example added to a general theory of far-right media ; it is a privileged site where securitization, colonial memory, migration, identity politics and diplomatic tension intersect in a single symbolic object.

4. Algeria as a Political and Racialized Other

The focus on Algeria enables the article to test the preceding framework on a corpus where the political and the historical are inseparable. Diplomatic tension, migration policy, Islam, colonial memory and national identity appear as distinct topics, yet television often folds them into one another, producing an unstable but powerful image of the Algerian Other.

4.1. Franco-Algerian Tensions as a Media Object

The French-Algerian crisis of 2024–2025 offers a particularly revealing case because it condenses several symbolic registers. Algeria appears at once as a diplomatic interlocutor, a postcolonial memory object, a migration issue, a security signifier and an internal French political category. Television discourse frequently shifts from one register to another without making the transitions explicit. A discussion about diplomatic relations can become a debate about immigration ; a debate about a detained writer can become a judgment on the Algerian state ; a controversy about memory can become an argument about French identity.

In the corpus, Algeria is often not treated as a complex sovereign state with its own institutional dynamics, social conflicts and historical trajectories. It is made to function as a mirror for French anxieties. This is why postcolonial representation remains essential to the analysis. Algeria is not only an external object ; it is also the name through which unresolved colonial memory returns in debates about integration, Islam, secularism and national belonging.

The cases of Boualem Sansal and Amir DZ, together with disputes over diplomatic cooperation, deportation, memory and the Western Sahara issue, illustrate this symbolic condensation. Each case has its own factual complexity. Yet television often places them within a single narrative of crisis : Algeria as repressive, uncooperative, hostile, humiliating or culturally incompatible. The problem is not that criticism of the Algerian state would be illegitimate. It is that criticism may be absorbed into a racialized and securitized grammar that extends from the state to populations, from diplomacy to migration, and from political disagreement to civilizational suspicion.

4.2. Migration, Security and National Identity

Three dominant frames can be identified. The first is securitization. Algerian migration or Franco-Algerian mobility is associated with insecurity, deportation, administrative failure or the inability of the French state to control its borders. The second is civilizational opposition. Algeria, Algerians, Muslims or Maghrebis are represented as culturally incompatible with a supposedly unified French identity. The third is memory reversal. Colonial violence is minimized, relativized or displaced, while France is presented as the humiliated party in contemporary diplomatic disputes.

These frames do not always appear in explicit far-right programs only. They may circulate in mainstream formats when guests, questions, images or headlines reproduce the same associations. This does not mean that all programs have the same ideology. It means that media frames can travel beyond their original political location. The far right wins discursively when its categories become the ordinary grammar through which other actors are invited to discuss Algeria.

The phrase ‘the Algerian danger’, whether explicit or implicit, condenses this logic. It turns a nationality into a sign of threat. It blurs the distinction between state, people, diaspora, migrant, Muslim, memory and security problem. It also performs a racializing operation because the category ‘Algerian’ no longer functions only as a legal or national designation. It becomes a symbolic container for suspicion. The racialization is not necessarily biological ; it is cultural, historical and securitarian.

4.3. Colonial Memory, Humiliation and Symbolic Reversal

The discourse of humiliation deserves particular attention. In some media sequences, France is represented as humiliated by Algeria, trapped by bilate-

ral agreements, weakened by immigration, or morally blackmailed by colonial memory. This rhetoric reverses the historical asymmetry of colonial relations. It displaces attention from colonization and war to contemporary French injury. The former colonial power is reimagined as the wounded party ; the former colonized state is represented as arrogant, ungrateful or hostile.

Such symbolic reversal is not a secondary rhetorical flourish. It allows far-right discourse to neutralize historical accountability. If France is the victim, then demands for memory, recognition or equality can be reframed as aggression. If Algeria is the humiliator, then diplomatic tension becomes a test of sovereignty rather than a complex bilateral issue. If Algerian migration is a threat, then the historical links produced by colonization can be erased in favor of an emergency discourse on borders and deportation.

This is why the Algerian case reveals the depth of far-right media normalization. The discourse appears to speak about immediate problems : a writer, an influencer, a diplomatic crisis, a deportation, a bilateral agreement. Yet it simultaneously activates older hierarchies : civilization versus disorder, Europe versus Maghreb, France versus Islam, sovereignty versus dependency, memory versus resentment. The present is made intelligible through a colonial archive that is rarely named as such.

4.4. The Symbolic Use of Experts and Oppositional Voices

The construction of Algeria as an object of media debate also depends on the selection of legitimate voices. Cultural programs may privilege writers and intellectuals critical of the Algerian state. Institutional programs may privilege legal experts, former diplomats and security officials. Continuous news channels may privilege polemicists and commentators able to translate events into conflictual formulas. Each selection produces a different Algeria : authoritarian state, diplomatic adversary, migration problem, memory object or civilizational challenge.

The point is not to deny the legitimacy of dissident or critical Algerian voices. Their presence may be essential for understanding censorship, repression and political conflict. The problem arises when these voices become the only authorized representation of Algerian complexity or when their criticism is absorbed into a French narrative that confirms pre-existing stereotypes. In such cases, the oppositional voice is extracted from its context and used to authorize a broader discourse of suspicion.

The symbolic use of experts, in Bourdieu's sense, is also central. Former ambassadors, legal specialists and security commentators lend authority to media narratives. Their speech may be more measured than polemical commentary, but it can still contribute to framing if it repeatedly interprets Algeria through failure, obstruction, hostility or refusal. Expertise becomes a form of legitimized simpli-

fication when the media situation does not allow the historical and diplomatic density of the issue to be reconstructed.

Table 5. Indicative corpus on Franco-Algerian tensions

Program / channel	Date / period	Actors / dominant voices	Main issue
C à vous / France 5	March 2025	Writers and cultural figures	Freedom of expression, Algeria, Western Sahara, censorship and cultural legitimacy.
Ça vous regarde / LCP	27 March 2025	MPs, legal and institutional actors	Justice, diplomacy, bilateral tension and public deliberation.
C dans l'air / France 5	23 January 2025	Government and center-right figures	Immigration, bilateral agreements, deportation and security.
Europe 1 interview	4 April 2025	Former ambassadorial expertise	Diplomacy, geopolitical interpretation and crisis narrative.
TF1 Info / BFMTV reports	2024–2025	Journalists, observers and public officials	Sansal case, Amir DZ affair, repression, memory and diplomatic tension.

Table 6. Recurring frames in the media construction of Algeria

Frame	Dominant narrative	Interpretation
Migration	Algerian mobility as burden or threat	Securitization ; association with deportation, crime or administrative failure.
National identity	Algeria/Maghreb/Islam as cultural incompatibility	Construction of an us/them boundary and symbolic defense of a homogeneous France.
Historical memory	Colonial violence minimized or displaced	Memory reversal ; France represented as humiliated rather than historically accountable.
Diplomatic conflict	Algeria portrayed as hostile or uncooperative	Transforms foreign-policy disagreement into a symbolic test of French sovereignty.
Expert legitimacy	Former diplomats, commentators or dissident voices authorize the frame	Transforms selected voices into evidence for pre-existing crisis narratives.

The analysis of Algeria allows the argument to return to its broader democratic implications. If far-right discourse gains influence through ecology, genre,

language and memory, then the problem is not limited to individual excesses ; it concerns the conditions under which democratic publicity itself is organized.

5. Discussion : Normalization, Legitimacy and Democratic Risk

This final part synthesizes the results and clarifies their democratic significance. It does not claim that the entire French media field is reducible to far-right ideology ; rather, it explains how particular frames travel across heterogeneous spaces and acquire legitimacy when repetition, affect and institutional visibility converge.

5.1. Normalization as Gradual Displacement

The analysis shows that normalization is not a single event but a gradual process. It begins when categories once confined to radical milieus become topics of respectable debate. It progresses when media formats reward affective intensity over contextual analysis. It consolidates when regulatory controversy is reframed as proof that ‘the system’ wishes to silence inconvenient truths. It becomes durable when digital circulation transforms the most conflictual sequences into repeatable ideological objects.

This process does not abolish democratic pluralism, but it weakens its conditions. Pluralism requires the confrontation of arguments, not the constant circulation of stigmatizing frames. Freedom of expression protects disagreement, satire, provocation and critique ; it does not require media institutions to convert minorities into permanent objects of suspicion or to make conspiracy vocabularies appear empirically equivalent to researched knowledge. The issue is therefore not censorship versus speech, but the ethical and epistemic responsibility of public communication.

The far right’s media influence rests on the capacity to shift the center of debate. Once the terms ‘submersion’, ‘replacement’, ‘Islamism’ or ‘national humiliation’ structure the conversation, the discussion begins from a position already favorable to exclusionary politics. Opponents are forced to deny, nuance or correct the frame rather than establish their own terms. This is one of the most important mechanisms of agenda-setting : controlling the question is often more decisive than winning the answer.

5.2. Democratic Risk and the Ethics of Public Communication

The democratic risk is threefold. The first risk is epistemic. When repeated frames replace contextual inquiry, public debate loses its capacity to distinguish between evidence, interpretation and ideological projection. The second risk is ethical. When groups are repeatedly associated with threat, they become available for suspicion, discrimination and symbolic violence. The third risk is institutional. When regulation, journalism, academic knowledge and judicial decisions are

systematically reframed as instruments of censorship or conspiracy, the institutions that sustain democratic disagreement are weakened.

The case of Algeria demonstrates the importance of historical memory in contemporary media conflicts. Far-right discourse draws power from the unresolved nature of colonial memory. By converting Algeria into a sign of threat, humiliation or demographic danger, it avoids confronting the historical asymmetry of colonial relations and reinserts colonial categories into present-day political conflict. The result is a racialized public discourse that appears to speak about diplomacy or security while simultaneously activating older hierarchies of civilization and belonging.

A responsible democratic response cannot consist only in excluding controversial speakers from public debate. Nor can it consist in treating all frames as equivalent in the name of formal pluralism. The challenge is to create media conditions in which disagreement remains possible without allowing the repeated stigmatization of groups to become entertainment. This requires stronger editorial contextualization, transparent guest selection, historical framing, correction of false causalities and attention to the cumulative effect of repetition.

5.3. Toward Critical Media Literacy and Counter-Framing

Countering far-right normalization requires more than fact-checking. Fact-checking is necessary when false information circulates, but it is insufficient when the problem lies in framing, affect and repetition. A statement can be factually ambiguous yet discursively harmful because it repeatedly associates a population with danger. A statistic can be correct yet misleading if detached from its context. A debate can be formally pluralist yet substantively unbalanced if the questions themselves reproduce far-right assumptions.

Critical media literacy must therefore teach audiences to identify frames, not only errors. It must ask : What is the problem made to be ? Who is made responsible ? Which emotions are invited ? Which histories are omitted ? Which images are repeated ? Which voices are absent ? Which solution becomes thinkable ? Such questions move the critique from isolated statements to the architecture of public meaning.

For researchers, the task is equally demanding. Future work should combine systematic content analysis, audience studies and platform circulation data in order to assess how television sequences move through online networks and how viewers interpret them. The present study provides a qualitative and historical reconstruction of mechanisms ; it should be complemented by quantitative mapping of airtime, speaker profiles, lexical recurrence, digital diffusion and reception.

Table 7. Influence strategies and democratic effects

Influence strategy	Examples / forms	Intended or likely effect
Emotional appeals	Fear, anger, resentment, humiliation, nostalgia	Mobilizes viewers through affect and reduces the space for contextual deliberation.
Populist anti-elite rhetoric	People versus corrupt elites, judges, journalists, academics or regulators	Undermines trust in institutions and presents the speaker as the voice of silenced truth.
Scapegoating minorities and migrants	Algerians, Muslims, migrants and racialized minorities linked to insecurity or decline	Shifts responsibility for structural problems onto visible groups and legitimizes exclusion.
Historical revisionism	Nostalgia for French Algeria, minimization of colonial violence	Reorders the past to support contemporary nationalist narratives.
Digital amplification	Clips, memes, headlines, online controversy	Transforms isolated sequences into repeatable ideological objects.
Regulatory victimization	Arcom or judicial decisions reframed as censorship	Converts accountability mechanisms into proof of persecution by “the system”.

Conclusion

Far-right discourse on French television is best understood as a media-cultural system rather than as a series of isolated provocations. Its power lies in the conjunction of historical repertoires, television genres, digital circulation, ownership structures, regulatory conflict and political crisis. From the anti-Semitic press of the Dreyfus period to contemporary continuous news and online aggregators, far-right communication has repeatedly adapted to available media forms while retaining a stable grammar of threat, decline, enemy construction and national purification.

The analysis has shown that the apparent diversity of media objects - parliamentary debate, continuous news, polemical talk shows, opinion media and digital aggregators - is traversed by recurrent operations of framing, repetition and affective condensation. These operations do not merely comment on political reality ; they help organize what can be perceived as self-evident, urgent or threatening within the public sphere.

In the contemporary French context, the representation of Algeria provides a privileged site for observing this grammar at work. Migration, security, memory and diplomacy are articulated into a narrative in which Algeria becomes less a geopolitical partner than a symbolic Other through which French anxieties about identity, sovereignty and historical responsibility are negotiated. This con-

struction is not merely rhetorical. It contributes to the social legitimacy of exclusionary politics and to the erosion of democratic debate.

The article therefore argues for a renewed critical media literacy capable of identifying not only false information but also the slower and more subtle processes of framing, repetition, affective saturation and symbolic displacement. Countering far-right normalization requires more than correcting individual errors. It requires reestablishing the conditions of contextual, historically informed and ethically responsible public discussion.

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