Introduction

The concept of “memory” has been utilized within the field of International Relations to study traumatic events, how they are perceived, remembered, and forgotten, as well as in the processes of memory production, identities, and interests in global politics. Memory is not a historical given or a completed and consensual past ; rather, it is a dynamic construct shaped within the context of struggles for meaning and hegemonic wills. Memory serves as a field of conflict, positioning, and a highly complex symbolic network that reflects the ontological essence of humans as “mnemonic beings.” As memory is a field of conflict and competition, it is susceptible to manipulation, as argued by Paul Ricoeur. He discussed the impairments that affect collective memory, including the manipulation of memory (Ricœur, 2014, p. 97). In this sense, memory has transformed into an instrumentalized tool, where its central function is to legitimize the system’s structure or authority. This leads to the production of an ideologically manipulated memory.

Given the background provided, it is evident that Chinese history and memory hold central importance in constructing contemporary Chinese identity. In a significant address in 2001, former Chinese President Jiang Zemin conveyed the following message : “With regard to the rich cultural legacies left over from China’s history of several thousand years, we should discard the dross, keep the essence, and carry forward and develop it in the spirit of the times in order to make the past serve the present” (Forsby, 2015, p. 164). In this context, Chinese history represents a collection of discursive structures, represented by a multitude of threads extending from the imperial legacy, its revolutionary past, and its developmental aspirations. It involves the “selective” use of historical narratives, which means choosing specific aspects of China’s history and culture that align with its historical role and the objectives of initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. China has adopted a discourse grounded in Chinese traditions, such as invoking the memory context of the historical past along the ancient Silk Road that connected civilizations, economies, and cultures globally. It is described as a route where various nations and diverse beliefs coexisted and achieved mutual development. In this regard, Xi Jinping emphasized in his discourse on the Belt and Road Initiative that it would adhere to the four basic principles of the ancient Silk Road, which include “peace and cooperation,” “mutual learning,” and “mutual benefit.” These principles form the “spirit of the Silk Road” that will facilitate cultural and economic connections among the initiative’s partners (Iing, 2020, p. 24).

This paper aims to deconstruct the discourse of development within the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and uncover the underlying power dynamics that govern it. It seeks to understand how strategic narrative is used to shape the Chinese project and how memory policies are employed to narrate China’s identity and its role in global power relations. State identity narratives are closely tied to actual beliefs, place, reputation, authority, and credibility. An example of identity narratives includes presenting China as a threat or an opportunity to the world and justifying the establishment of the Belt and Road Initiative, which provides profit and cooperation for all. As a result, the narrative of issues is explained by the need to adopt a desired “normative” policy and how to implement it. Thus, strategic narrative helps China convey its new role/identity and vision for the global system to local and international audiences. Consequently, the paper asks how memory policies are used in the Chinese discourse to promote the peaceful nature of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Therefore, this paper argues that resorting to memory and using it constitutes a crucial element in China’s quest for global influence in international affairs through the Belt and Road Initiative. The ruling party in China has sought to construct commemorative narratives outside of China to enhance China’s soft power, especially as nuclear deterrence and mutual economic interdependence have reduced the likelihood of great power competition using these traditional tools. Therefore, memory gains importance in the future as an arena for U.S.-China competition.

1. Memory Politics : The Construction of Chinese Identity

Memory politics refers to how collective memory and historical narratives are manipulated, constructed, or controlled by individuals, groups, or governments for various political, social, or ideological purposes. In the context of China, this practice involves not only shaping public memory but also selectively remembering or forgetting historical events to serve specific agendas and influence public opinion. Memory politics plays a pivotal role in matters related to national identity, historical interpretations, commemoration, and the utilization of historical symbols and events to either legitimize or challenge political authority. Within the broader framework of memory politics, President Xi Jinping recognizes the importance of historical continuity in understanding China’s ancient, modern, and future identity, stating,

“If one does not learn about China from the continuity of its long history, there is no way to understand ancient China, nor is it possible to understand modern China, let alone China in the future” (Mayer & Pawlik, 2023, p. 140).

This reinforces the state’s vision for a collective sense of identity that aligns with the nation’s overarching goals and aspirations. Memory politics in China is a tool for constructing and reinforcing a distinct Chinese identity in line with the state’s vision.

In contemporary international relations, narratives have become a tool of national power no less significant than military or economic strength. As noted by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in 1999, the decisive determinant of global dominance is no longer solely based on who wins in terms of military or economic power. Instead, it revolves around the question, “Whose story wins ?” (Ohnesorge & Owen, 2023, p. 288).

In recent years, especially in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there has been what is called a “narrative turn” in IR (Ohnesorge & Owen, 2023, p. 288). National efforts no longer rely on military coercion or economic incentives but rather on the power of attraction and persuasion. In other words, the use of memory policies is considered a facet of soft state power, referred to as “memory power” by both Hendrik W. Ohnesorge and John M. Owen. This memory power serves as a tool for unifying the state and directing it toward specific international objectives and, externally, as a means to attract foreign groups and communities. This observation highlights the intersection of memory and power and the crucial role of elites in shaping memory. Eric Langenbacher pointed out that there is an inherent dimension of power and competition in all intellectual phenomena, implying that memory is inevitably used for political or partisan purposes. Thus, memory becomes a source of political power. Ohnesorge and Owen add that any political authority needs a particular narrative to build its presence, reason for existence, and legitimacy both internally and externally, especially for those entities with aspirations of great power (Ohnesorge & Owen, 2023, p. 293).

In this context, Jean Assmann developed the concept of “the infrastructure of memory” to study two main puzzles. First, how collective memories become subject to change, and second, the extent to which these memories homogenize to support the legitimacy of the party-state and its policies within a rapidly modernizing society undergoing profound environmental and social changes. In other words, Assmann sees the infrastructure of memory as addressing a theoretical challenge in supporting a collective common imagination (Mayer & Pawlik, 2023, p. 142). Similarly, Alonso, in 1988, suggests that groups and classes controlling state apparatuses gain legitimacy through representations of the past, selectively choosing what aligns with their interests. The Foucauldian approach to counter-memory places memory and forgetting practices in the context of power relations, as the monopolistic control of memory is a form of domination. David Thelen explains this by stating,

“The struggle for possession and interpretation of memory is rooted in the conflict and interplay among social, political, and cultural interests...” (Olick & Robbins, 1998, p. 127).

Based on this background, it can be said that acts of remembrance, memorialization, and selective forgetting constitute a cornerstone of political concerns in China. Chinese Communist Party leaders emphasize that “the Chinese nation has a million-year history of mankind, a cultural history of 10,000 years, and a history of civilization of more than 5,000 years.” In this context, preserving the memories of the long past is deemed necessary as the heritage and cultural treasures carry the so-called “genes of the Chinese nation.” From the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party, the mobilization of cultural heritage and historical narratives, which include allusions to imperial dynasties and the history of the Chinese Communist Party, serves multiple objectives. In essence, this political and cultural endeavor aims to underpin political legitimacy within an environment marked by sluggish economic growth and reinforce China’s identity by invoking accounts of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Mayer & Pawlik, 2023, p. 140).

China has struggled to reposition itself as a national power in the context of power relations and sovereign states after the collapse of the tribute system and Confucian traditions in the late 19th century, a period marked by a deep identity crisis. Beijing’s aspirations for reshaping Chinese identity have been the primary driver for rekindling the memory of China’s history, closely linked to the forced transformation of consciousness acquired by the Chinese people through a series of historical events. Consequently, the modern party-state actively involves itself in the promotion of cultural heritage and shaping of a shared Chinese identity during the rapid economic development and the increasing global impact of China (Mayer & Pawlik, 2023).

Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and regaining sovereignty after the war with Japan, generations of Chinese leaders have attempted to restore their country’s global status as a former great power under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, putting an end to what was called the “Century of Humiliation” (Yang, 2020, pp. 2-3). This historical awareness during the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), a period that dramatically altered the course of Chinese history, forms the cornerstone of the Chinese discourse. During this period, China lost about a third of its territory, abolished its millennia-old imperial system, plunged into civil war, and saw the European powers and Japan dismantle the Chinese trade network alongside the Opium Wars. While China was not directly colonized like much of Southeast Asia, it was compelled to cede its sovereign rights following the Nanjing Treaty, under which the Qing Dynasty submitted to a series of unequal treaties. These centuries are considered a crucial building block in Chinese identity formation (Zhang, 2013, p. 5).

The efforts of Chinese leaders, in one of their dimensions over the past decades, have relied on various discursive practices. These practices have served as an incentive to regain historical status and a driving force for Chinese behavioral patterns in the international system. These discursive practices have dominated the official collective memory of China to a significant extent, until Xi Jinping assumed his position as the leader. Chinese history holds central importance in building the identity of contemporary China. This idea was succinctly summarized by former Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 2001 :

“With regard to the rich cultural legacies left over from China’s history of several thousand years, we should discard the dross, keep the essence, and carry forward and develop it in the spirit of the times in order to make the past serve the present” (Forsby, 2015, p. 164).

In other words, this history is a collection of discursive structures, represented by the product of various threads extending from the imperial legacy, its revolutionary past, its developmental aspirations, and the “selective” use of historical narratives. This involves selecting specific aspects of China’s history and culture that align with its history and role on one hand and the aspirations of the Belt and Road Initiative on the other, as will be explained further in this article (Noort, 2020, p. 189).

In this context, the new directions of Chinese foreign policy indicate a lack of complete satisfaction with the existing international system. The Chinese elites within the Communist Party, led by Xi, see that with China’s economic and military growth, it is time to put in the effort to reshape the international system that was dominated by the United States. They argue that the current system needs reform as it does not adequately accommodate recent global changes, such as multipolarity, technological advancements, and the interests of developing countries, which China considers itself part of. Against this backdrop, Xi Jinping has called for taking a leadership role in global governance (Yang, 2020, p. 4).

2. On the relationship between strategic narrative and promoting the (BRI)

Heritage plays a fundamental role in the Chinese authorities’ reconstruction of the regional memory of the New Silk Road. One of the official goals of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is to improve people-to-people connections, a goal that China seeks to achieve by using local and international heritage to reconstruct the New Silk Road. There are various examples of how the Chinese government supports the reframing of heritage to promote the peaceful aspects of the BRI. In Guangzhou, Chinese historians and policymakers worked together to demonstrate that the city was one of the former ports from which Chinese sailors began to explore the South China Sea (Poozi, 2022, p. 142).

In this context, Hong Yu suggests that the driving force behind the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the growing sense of national pride accompanying China’s emergence as a global power and the world’s second-largest economy (Wang, 2021, p. 9). Therefore, President Xi Jinping’s administration relies on the use of strategic narratives to justify China’s pursuit of global governance reform and rule-setting while not seeking to change the existing international system (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, & Roselle, 2013, p. 5). According to Yi Edward Yang, China does not have the interest or capability to engage in costly and constrained military and political methods. Chinese leaders recognize that the network of rules and institutions in the current international system provides a useful basis for economic growth. In the same context, Lan Yuying Liu argues that China’s material interests are not achieved through counter-hegemony but through the continuity of the existing liberal system (Liu, 2018, p. 82). China has incentives not to challenge or replace the current system. This situation resembles what Steven Ward describes as a stage of “redistributive dissatisfaction.” In other words, the rising power, dissatisfied with its current status, seeks to reform and restructure the existing international system, not replace it. This, in turn, requires the formulation of a new vision for the global system through a persuasive narrative. Furthermore, China’s reliance on the existing international economic system and its benefit from it does not mean that it will fully accept Western rules and values. China is dissatisfied in many ways with the current institutional presence, particularly evident in its calls for reform of the international monetary system after the global financial crisis of 2008 (Wang, 2021, p. 8).

In this way, China’s intentions towards the current system can be summarized in two aspects : enhancing its role as a rule-maker/standard-setter and leading the reform of certain areas of global governance that it deems incompatible with its specific interests. To achieve its ambition of leading global governance reform, Xi Jinping presented a long-term vision for transforming the international system and positioning China as a global leader through the concept of a “Community of Shared Destiny for Mankind”. This concept was first introduced in the report of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012. Since then, this vision has become the guiding principle for China’s approach to various challenges in international affairs. In September 2015, Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, in which he elaborated that the “Community of Shared Destiny for Mankind” encompasses five broad dimensions : political partnership, security, economic development, cultural exchanges, and the environment (Wang, 2021, p. 8).

According to the official Chinese interpretation, the concept of a “Community of Shared Destiny” represents a new approach to international relations that embodies principles of equality and justice. It envisions a society in which all countries collectively shape the future of the world, formulate international rules, manage global affairs, and ensure the participation of all in development outcomes, in addition to fostering mutually beneficial relationships. The content of this vision clearly illustrates China’s endeavor to redefine itself as a leader meeting the aspirations of developing nations (Wang, 2021, p. 9). In this context, the Belt and Road Initiative serves as the framework through which China materializes its vision of a “Community of Shared Destiny”. China utilizes the initiative as a strategy to embody its values and standards, create a positive perception, and, consequently, gain acceptance of its leadership model in the international system (Parepa, 2020, p. 179). Furthermore, the institutions and standards under the initiative can have a positive impact on the identities of actors in the long run, thereby leading to common understandings. China has adopted a discourse rooted in Chinese traditions, such as evoking the memory context of the historical Silk Road (Miriam Costa, 2020, p. 28) which connected civilizations, economies, and cultures globally (Galleli & Heinrich, 2020, p. 27) describing it as a path where people of various backgrounds and beliefs coexisted and achieved mutual development. In this regard, Xi Jinping emphasized in his speech on the Belt and Road Initiative that it will adhere to the four fundamental principles of the ancient Silk Road, namely “peace and cooperation,” “mutual learning,” and “mutual benefit.” These principles constitute the “spirit of the Silk Road,” which will facilitate cultural and economic connections among initiative partners (Iing, 2020, p. 24).

According to the researcher Feng Zhang, Chinese leaders employ historical and cultural resources to support the narrative that distinguishes Chinese foreign policy as “peaceful” from Western policies labeled as “imperialistic”. China asserts that the Belt and Road Initiative is based on a different peaceful development path compared to Western development models, and it considers Confucian culture as one of the most prominent philosophical resources used to make this claim (Zhang, 2013, p. 12). The core argument is that New Confucianism is rooted in the idea of prioritizing the interests of the community over the individual and minimizing the use of force (Gao, 2004, p. 48). Furthermore, Zhang argues that China’s promotion of a peaceful narrative aims to dispel doubts about the aspirations of the Belt and Road Initiative and to debunk what is known as the “China threat theory” by emphasizing the peaceful nature of the initiative’s objectives (Zhang, 2013, pp. 12-13). According to Yuleng Zeng, the China threat discourse and geopolitical influence are based on mere assumptions, lacking empirical evidence. While there have been relatively few efforts to provide empirical assessment of the political impacts of the Belt and Road Initiative, despite abundant research on the incentives of the Chinese government, there is a relatively lesser focus on the actual impact of the initiative. He adds that the initiative has not fundamentally altered political relations among member countries. Contrary to the expectations of the commercial liberal perspective, Belt and Road countries tend to engage in less intense competition with China, especially non-neighboring countries with lower levels of cooperation with China. Yuleng argues that the geopolitical impact across initiative countries varies depending on the strategic importance of each country to China (Zeng, 2021, p. 81).

President Xi Jinping, on the fifth anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative, emphasized that the initiative is an economic cooperation project, not a geopolitical or military alliance. He stated that it represents an open development path and is not about creating a Chinese club (Bunskoek & Shih, 2021, p. 11). Examining the importance of discursive practices in understanding the Chinese leaders’ perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative and how they serve Chinese interests, Catia Miriam Costa analyzed President Xi Jinping’s early speeches delivered in Kazakhstan and Indonesia. She aimed to explore how the strategic narrative in the Chinese discourse about the initiative is employed globally and to uncover the logic of the Chinese identity. Her findings suggest that President Xi presented a historical perspective on millennia-old journeys and communications between China and Central Asian countries based on peace and friendship. Through this perspective, he aimed to bridge the gap between the past and the present, building on the collective memory of opening the way to the future. Concepts of trust, development, and barrier-free cooperation among all peoples along the Silk Road, with a focus on the common interest in the success of the Belt and Road, are the key rhetorical tools used by Xi to export his vision in local, regional, and global contexts (Leandro & Paulo Afonso B. Duarte, 2019, pp. 38-39).

Gallelli and Heinrich add that Xi Jinping’s focus on the shared past of the Belt and Road Initiative serves two purposes. Firstly, it aims to bolster the narrative of the “Chinese Dream” (中国梦) of “National Renewal” by reminding of the origins of the Han and Tang dynasties, during which the ancient Silk Road was established and thrived. This history helps define China’s global role, emphasizing the profound cultural and historical significance of the Chinese political system. China’s cultural past has become of paramount importance, as it seeks to restore its global position as the “Middle Kingdom” with a rich history spanning five thousand years (Winter, 2021, p. 12). Secondly, the initiative is presented as a “problem-solving” strategy in response to the existing Western-dominated economic system and the economic and financial challenges left behind by the Bretton Woods legacy (Heinrich & Galleli, 2020, pp. 30-31). It portrays China as a country with resources and power, ready and willing to take a leadership role in international affairs. This positions China as a key player capable of addressing global economic challenges and contributing to the global order (Leandro & Paulo Afonso B. Duarte, 2019, p. 4).

This attempt to define China as a new major power is part of a larger political and intellectual project aimed at constructing the Chinese national identity, as mentioned earlier, and developing a distinct diplomatic philosophy for its foreign relations. Based on this, three components can be identified in shaping the political discourse for constructing the Chinese identity towards the Belt and Road Initiative : the cultural component, the peaceful inclination, and the harmonious world outlook. Chinese elites have adopted this discourse to create a harmonious reality and a shared development model, rather than engaging in a zero-sum game (Zeng, 2021, p. 6).

3. The discourse of development in the Belt and Road Initiative

There is another important aspect, which lies in China’s claim that its behavior is that of a developing nation, justified by the development of investment and aid models aimed at presenting China as a “responsible power,” as expressed by Sanja Arezina (Arežina, 2021, p. 82). Unity and cooperation between the Global South have always been a fundamental component of China’s foreign policy and diplomacy. Moreover, the developmental context of the Belt and Road Initiative is directed towards engaging developing countries in mutual global interdependence and cooperating with these intercontinental nations by exporting the Chinese developmental model. Nevertheless, many developing countries in the African continent that have joined the initiative, for example, are located outside the mentioned economic corridors (Xiaoyu, 2017, p. 146).

However, despite the diversity emphasized in China’s discourse on the initiative, especially the “peace and harmony” narrative, Zhang argues that it obscures the Chinese interests it seeks to achieve. The Chinese initiative is considered a complex product of political and economic needs and the constraints imposed by the international order’s structure. Exploiting historical and cultural resources is merely a justification for the goals of the Belt and Road Initiative (Zhang, 2013, p. 19).

Regardless of the circumstances, it can be said that the Belt and Road Initiative is fundamentally shaped by a normative force that envisions China as a “benign” partner that can be trusted, and the initiative as a means to create a “win-win” situation by imagining a future of a “community of shared destiny” led by China. This concept represents one of the components of a new diplomatic strategy within the era of Xi Jinping, and it includes : Firstly, the Chinese dream of maintaining domestic unity and stability. Secondly, a new type of great power relations that involves seeking ways for peaceful coexistence with major powers. Thirdly, a community of shared destiny to ensure a peaceful and stable neighboring environment, which is crucial for China’s continued rise.

In this context, as the world’s largest developing nation, China has placed significant importance on cultivating friendly relations with a large number of Southern countries since its emergence after the end of colonialism. Cooperation with African nations, in particular, has become a crucial part of China’s foreign relations, spanning over 60 years (Xinying, 2023, p. 142). Chinese foreign aid initially emerged within the geopolitical context of the Cold War and was further bolstered after it participated in the 1955 Bandung Conference, which solidified solidarity among the Third World against colonialism, racism, and imperialism, giving rise to a new form of counter-geopolitical relations defined by Southern countries. Subsequently, Chinese development cooperation expanded during the 1960s and 1970s, especially with African nations. Despite its modest scale, what set it apart were its favorable terms and adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. With the transformation of the Chinese economy and its growing demand for energy and resources, facilitated by the “Going Out” policy launched in 1999, China reshaped its ideological standards and pursued pragmatic motives based on the principle of “interest-based solidarity.” This involved a mix of objectives, including building a fair and just international system, promoting itself as an independent state, while positioning as a leading economic power (Cheng & Liu, 2021, p. 03).

China has also sought to renew the collective identity of the Global South in a changing international context, especially considering China’s rising power and status. Hence, the Belt and Road Initiative became a part of this identity within the context of international competition over values and standards. According to Marcin Kaczmarski, China attempts to integrate its traditional way of thinking about the outside world, characterized by “Chinese centrality and a preference for bilateral relations with weaker states,” with Western forms of multilateral cooperation such as development banks and international organizations. William A. Callahan, on the other hand, has mentioned that Chinese foreign diplomacy is not only about mutually beneficial cooperation but also works to promote China’s new vision of global governance (Kallio, 2023, p. 232). President Xi Jinping declared in the Belt and Road Forum in 2017 that China is ready to share its development practices with other countries (Cheng & Liu, 2021, p. 07).

When discussing China’s strategic visions in global governance, Henrique Altemani and Alexander Cesar refer to Will Shield’s work on conceptions related to the global economy and governance. Shield observe that the structure of the international system is unequal, undemocratic, and thus unfair (Nascimento & Sheng, 2021, p. 35). Simultaneously, the global economy is always subject to local concerns. Based on this, the foreign policies pursued by China and other countries always rely on realistic political calculations of national interest. These strategies reflect a geopolitical tension expanding from the narrow scope of bilateral relations between the United States and China to a more geographically comprehensive competition based on the superiority of development models. China seeks to present itself as an alternative to the West through the “Chinese characteristics socialism” model, which offers a new approach to achieving development specifically geared towards developing countries that wish to accelerate their growth while maintaining their independence (Cheng & Liu, 2021, p. 04).

According to the information provided, the Belt and Road Initiative serves as a wide conduit for China’s soft power projection. This initiative plays a crucial role in expanding China’s diplomatic outreach beyond Asia to Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, and Africa. Beijing has made significant investments in extending its soft power influence and reshaping its national image and reputation in the African continent to distinguish itself from traditional global hegemonies like the United States. China has positioned itself as a leader in South-South cooperation, particularly in its engagement with the African continent. This is evident in their communicative terms such as “exchange and cooperation,” used in economic, political, cultural, and educational interactions. Additionally, they frequently emphasize values like mutual respect, friendship, mutually beneficial and “win-win” relations, and mutual benefit (Chidiebere Edeh & Bin Han, 2023, p. 09).

In the same context, Chinese researchers argue that China views itself as a developing nation, guided by economic and political traditions different from those that evolved in the West. China believes it can offer an attractive development model for the Global South, where economic development remains a top priority for developing countries. Additionally, it can present an appealing foreign policy model based on respecting the political and cultural specificities of nations, as opposed to adopting the universal and ahistorical logic that the West seeks to impose on the world (one governance model, one development model, one set of values, and so on) (حمشي، 2019، الصفحات 20-21). Therefore, the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative largely depends on how it is interpreted by the targeted audiences, including international relations researchers both inside and outside China (Garlick, 2020, p. 13).

In a contrasting context, Bang Zheng Ying suggests that the most important thing for China is to define its “self” so that it can clarify its foreign policy and avoid misinterpretation of the goals of the initiative. Chinese scholars agree that China has multiple identities rather than a single one, as it adopts a political discourse rooted in various ideologies and banners. This is because China occupies multiple axes in global politics. China is a socialist state with Chinese characteristics, with the Communist Party being the ruling party, which is a key feature of the Chinese system.

In this context, Yuan Beng remarks,

“Westerners sometimes exaggerate China’s socialist characteristics by labeling it as a communist state, while at other times they ignore China’s socialist nature and treat it as a purely capitalist country.”

This assertion aligns with David Shambaugh’s analysis, who sees China going through an identity crisis lately, as it possesses competing identities. Chinese foreign policy displays diverse, sometimes conflicting, and sometimes integrated orientations. At times, it acts as a new imperialist power by seeking to exploit resource-rich nations, while at other times, it aims to make trade deals to expand and diversify its global partnerships. Shambaugh adds that this reflects internal identity debates (تامة و مشري، 2022، الصفحات 100-101).

Conclusion

The discourse of memory within the context of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plays a pivotal role in shaping China’s global influence and foreign policy strategies. Memory, in this context, is not just a reflection of the past but a dynamic construct, instrumentalized to legitimize China’s authority and justify its vision of a “Community of Shared Destiny for Mankind.” The Chinese leadership utilizes memory, culture, and history to construct a narrative that portrays the BRI as a peaceful and benevolent endeavor, rooted in ancient traditions of cooperation and mutual benefit. The BRI serves as a strategic tool to project China’s soft power globally, especially in regions beyond Asia. By emphasizing its role as a developing nation offering an alternative development model, China aims to foster closer relations with the Global South. This narrative is intended to distinguish China from Western hegemonies and promote its leadership in South-South cooperation. China’ aims to create a harmonious world and to reshape the existing international system by providing an inclusive vision for global governance. Overall, the BRI’s development discourse, steeped in cultural memory and historical narratives, plays a multifaceted role in shaping China’s identity, its role in international affairs, and its vision for a changing world order. It reflects China’s ambition to lead global governance reform and reaffirms its status as a major global power with a unique approach to development and cooperation. As the competition between major powers, particularly between China and the United States, evolves, the role of memory within the BRI discourse is likely to continue gaining significance in international relations.